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Cooperation in Polygynous Households†
By Abigail Barr, Marleen Dekker, Wendy Janssens, Bereket Kebede,  
and Berber Kramer*
Using a carefully designed series of public goods games, we com-
pare, across monogamous and polygynous households, the willing-
ness of husbands and wives to cooperate to maximize household 
gains. Compared to monogamous husbands and wives, polygynous 
husbands and wives are less cooperative, one with another, and 
co-wives are least cooperative, one with another. The husbands’ and 
wives’ behavior in a corresponding series of inter-household games 
indicates that these differences cannot be attributed to selection of 
less cooperative people into polygyny. Finally, behavior in polyg-
ynous households is more reciprocal and less apparently altruistic.
(JEL C93, D13, J12, O12)
Many programs aimed at reducing poverty in low and middle income coun-
tries (LIMCs) involve transfers to households of either cash or in-kind resources 
(Morduch 2011; Baird et al. 2014; Banerjee et al. 2015; Banerjee, Karlan, and 
Zinman 2015). The optimal design of such programs depends on how decisions are 
made within households. Understandably, considerable attention has been given to 
the issue of whether positive effects on children’s and other household outcomes 
are greatest when the transfer recipient is the husband or the wife (e.g., Thomas 
1990, 1994; Duflo 2003; Yoong, Rabinovich, and Diepeveen 2012; Benhassine et al. 
2015; Akresh, de Walque, and Kazianga 2016; Ambler 2016) and, relatedly, to hus-
band-wife differences in resource allocations and to spousal cooperativeness (e.g., 
Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981; Browning et al. 1994; Udry 
1996; Iversen et al. 2011; Bezu and Holden 2015).
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However, as the rollout of such programs in Africa gathers momentum (Garcia 
and Moore 2012), another issue is beginning to loom large: that of how such pro-
grams should be adapted to accommodate polygynous households. In some coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa, many in West Africa, over 40 percent of women are 
in polygynous marriages (Elbedour et al. 2002, Dalton and Leung 2014). This is 
raising new challenges for policy makers interested in optimizing program impacts 
and highlighting gaps in our understanding of how decision-making differs between 
polygynous and monogamous households (Van Domelen and Coll-Black 2010, 
Baland and Ziparo 2017).
In this paper, we investigate whether and how spousal cooperativeness differs 
between monogamous and polygynous households. We hypothesized that coopera-
tion would be lower within polygynous households. Our reasoning was as follows. 
Polygyny is associated with higher male premarital social and/or economic status 
and, hence, better ex ante prospects (e.g., Hames 1996, Zeitzen 2008, Chaudhary 
et al. 2015). However, it is also associated with worse welfare outcomes, especially 
for junior wives and their children, even after controlling for household resources 
and number of children (Amey 2002, Hadley 2005, Tertilt 2005, Bove and Valeggia 
2009, Gyimah 2009, Shepard 2013). The gap between ex ante prospects and ex post 
welfare outcomes suggests that polygynous households are less efficient, and this 
could be owing to the members of such households being less cooperative.
Cooperation could be lower in polygynous compared to monogamous households 
for many reasons including competition between co-wives, larger spousal age gaps, 
reduced paternity certainty, and lower genetic relatedness (Jankowiak, Sudakov, and 
Wilreker 2005; Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson 2012). Compared to monogamous 
spouses, members of polygynous marriages, in particular co-wives, have been found 
to engage in more self-serving strategic behavior. For instance, polygynous wives 
strategically raise their fertility in response to an increase in the fertility of their 
co-wives in order to maintain bargaining power over resources controlled by the 
husband (Rossi 2016); and co-wives have been found to be more conditional in 
their cooperativeness, one with another, compared to husbands and wives, when 
cultivating land for household consumption (Akresh, Chen, and Moore 2012, 2016).
By inviting spouses to make decisions with real monetary consequences in a 
series of two-person public goods games (PGGs), we generate directly comparable 
measures of the extent to which husbands cooperate with their wives, wives with 
their husbands, co-wives with each other, and husbands and wives with members 
of other households. We compare cooperation across monogamous and polygynous 
households and investigate whether cooperation within polygynous households var-
ies depending on who is interacting with whom. Using data on participants’ beliefs 
about others’ cooperativeness, we also undertake a preliminary investigation into 
whether the differences in cooperation can be explained by differences in how 
husbands and wives condition their own cooperativeness on their beliefs about the 
cooperativeness of their spouses and co-wives.
Overall, we find high contribution rates in intra-household games, but in polyg-
ynous husband-wife pairs, we find lower contribution rates than in monogamous 
husband-wife pairs, and contribution rates are even lower in co-wife pairs. In games 
with adults from other households, contribution rates are much lower and do not 
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differ between monogamous and polygynous household members, suggesting that 
the difference in intra-household contribution rates are owing to an effect of the 
marriage institution rather than the selection of less cooperative people into polyg-
yny. Further, we find that there are differences across the household types in the 
way husbands and wives condition their cooperativeness on how much they believe 
their spouses and co-wives will cooperate. Specifically, behavior in polygynous 
households is more reciprocal and less apparently altruistic than in monogamous 
households. This is consistent with findings from studies using observational data 
(Akresh, Chen, and Moore 2012, 2016; Rossi 2016).1 Our experiment complements 
these field-based studies as it allows us to investigate intra-household cooperation 
in a controlled environment and make informative ceteris paribus comparisons 
between intra- and inter-household cooperation.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on cooperation between spouses 
in lab-type experiments. Most of the studies in this literature focus on monogamous 
households (Peters et al. 2004; Mani 2011; Iversen et al. 2011; Castilla and Walker, 
2013; Cochard, Couprie, and Hopfensitz 2016; Kebede et al. 2014; Munro et al. 
2014; Castilla 2015; Beblo and Beninger 2017). To our knowledge, the only other 
experimental study looking at intra-household cooperative efficiency in polygynous 
households is by Munro et al. (2010). However, they investigated neither differences 
in behavior across the various dyads within polygynous households nor differences 
in inter-household cooperation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents our 
experimental design and procedures. Section II presents the main results. Section III 
concludes.
I. Methods
A. Participant Sample and Study Context
The experiment was conducted in Kwara State, Nigeria, in June and July 2013 as 
a complement to a panel survey of 613 adults of whom 492 were married. During 
the final survey round, all adult respondents were invited to participate in a work-
shop to investigate how people make decisions about money. Of the 492 married 
invitees, all but four showed up. The six spouses of the four no-shows were excluded 
from the analysis. Also excluded from the analysis were the members of one house-
hold with two co-wives but no husband and eight polygynous households with three 
wives. The final analysis sample consisted of 448 married individuals who were in 
either monogamous (110 men, 110 women) or polygynous marriages involving two 
wives (76 men, 152 women).
1 In fact, Akresh, Chen, and Moore (2012, 2016) finds that where reciprocity is greater, cooperation is higher. 
However, they focus on a decision-making context in which contributions are observable, so, free-riding is pun-
ishable and threats of punishment sustain cooperation. Altruism in this context undermines cooperation because it 
undermines individuals’ ability to credibly threaten to punish. In contrast, we focus on a context in which contribu-
tions cannot be observed, and free-riding cannot be punished. In this context, altruism supports cooperation, ceteris 
paribus, and so too does reciprocity, but only if it is accompanied by a belief that the other will also cooperate. 
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Most of the participants were from the Nupe ethnic group, the majority ethnic 
group in Niger State and an important minority in Kwara state. There are approxi-
mately 3.5 million Nupe and they live in central and northern Nigeria.2 Their geo-
graphical proximity to the Yoruba, the second largest ethnic group in Nigeria, has 
led to many cross-cultural influences. Living arrangements among Nupe and Yoruba 
people in northern Kwara state are comparable, based on patrilineal and patrilocal 
family structures in which polygyny is common (Ajadi et al. 2015).
Nupe marriages are usually arranged, rarely formally registered, and almost 
always involve a bride-price (Nadel 1942). The bride-price is an exchange of 
resources for rights over a woman and a confirmation of the bonds between two 
families and kinship groups. The bride-price transaction has the significance of a 
contract to which the two families are guarantors (Nadel 1942, Katcha 1978). The 
number of wives a man has is an indicator of wealth and status (Nadel 1942). Both 
deuterogamy (i.e., marrying the wife of a deceased brother) (Ajadi et al. 2015) and 
divorce are common in Nupe culture (Katcha 1978).
Polygynous families tend to co-reside, although each wife (with her children) 
usually occupies her own room or group of rooms within the compound and shares 
meals principally within her own nuclear household (Katcha 1978). Formally, the 
Nupe adhere to the maximum of four wives stipulated by the Quran to ensure equal 
treatment of each wife. However, informally, more partners are allowed, for exam-
ple, in the form of concubines or older ex-wives who remain in the family com-
pound, and inequalities between spouses are tolerated (Nadel 1942; Strassmann 
1997; Ukwuani, Cornwell, and Suchindran 2002).
Individuals in our study area are predominantly involved in farming, trading, 
and agriculture-related business. Thirty percent of married women work as farm-
ers or farm laborers, while 60 percent are traders. Despite similarities between 
Yoruba and Nupe (see also Oni 1996), rural Nupe women have somewhat greater 
agency over productive resources compared to their Yoruba neighbors (Ajadi et al. 
2015).  Decision-making power is tilted toward Nupe men in what types of crops 
to grow, which agricultural inputs to purchase, and whether to sell land and large 
livestock, and toward Nupe women in the sale of smaller animals (goats, chicken) 
and when to take crops to the market. Women generally generate and keep part of 
their own income.
Table 1 provides descriptive information about our participant sample. Notable 
differences across the monogamous and polygynous subsamples are that polygy-
nous households are larger, polygynous husbands have more children, and the wives 
of polygynous husbands tend to be less educated. Moreover, polygynous households 
are more likely to be Muslim and reside in rural areas. We will control for these 
differences in the analyses.
2 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nupe_people, accessed August 1, 2018.
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B. Experimental Task
Each participant played a series of linear two-person public goods games 
(PGGs). At the start of each game, a participant was given an initial endowment. 
Initial endowments varied and were known only to the recipients.3 With a 95 percent 
probability, a participant’s initial endowment was 220 Naira (₦220) in each game 
(approximately US$1.50, one-third of median daily cash income).4 However, each 
participant faced a 5 percent chance of receiving an initial endowment between 
₦180 and ₦20. The range of possible initial endowments was common knowledge, 
but participants did not know the probabilities associated with each.
Each participant then had to decide, in private, how much of that initial endow-
ment to contribute to a shared fund and how much to keep. The money they chose 
to keep they could put in their pocket straight away. Once both playing partners 
had made their contributions, the shared fund was multiplied by 1.5 and divided 
equally between the two. Participants maximized their joint earnings from the game 
by contributing their entire initial endowment to the shared fund. However, a partic-
ipant maximized individual earnings, given any playing partner’s contribution, by 
contributing nothing and going home with his or her own initial endowment plus 
three-quarters of the partner’s contribution.
Each participant played the PGG three times, each time with a different play-
ing partner. Every monogamous husband (wife) played one game with his (her) 
3 This gave spouses a chance to hide money from each other. 
4 The median daily cash income from employment, agriculture, and business for the participant sample was 
₦600. The exchange rate at the time of the games (July 2013) was US$0.615 = ₦100. 
Table 1—Participant Sample Characteristics
  Monogamous Polygynous
Variable Male Female Male Female
Age   48.38   37.89   48.42   36.81
Household size 5.527 5.527 8.934 8.934
Education (years) 6.771 2.783 6.173 1.553
Education (category):
 No education 0.342 0.642 0.361 0.757
 (Some) primary completed 0.181 0.226 0.253 0.204
 (Some) secondary completed 0.248 0.085 0.173 0.039
 Higher education 0.229 0.047 0.213 0.000
Nupe 0.914 0.915 0.960 0.974
Muslim 0.867 0.840 0.960 0.954
Earning 0.952 0.896 0.973 0.927
Wealth −0.001 −0.001 −0.080 −0.080
Urban 0.318 0.318 0.105 0.105
Number of children 4.818 4.818 8.680 4.309
Comprehension of game 3.682 3.745 3.697 3.671
Observations 110 110 76 152
Notes: Age = age in years; household size = number of household members; education = years of formal educa-
tion completed; Nupe = 1 if participant belongs to Nupe ethnic group; Muslim = 1 if participant Muslim; earn-
ing = 1 if participant brings monetary income into household; wealth = household-level asset index; urban = 1 if 
household is in an urban area; number of children = reported by wives (for monogamous husbands, we use number 
reported by their wife; for polygynous husbands, we use the sum of the number of children reported by first and 
second wife); and comprehension of game = number (out of four) of test questions about game correctly answered.
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wife (husband). Every polygynous husband played one game with each of his two 
wives. Every wife of a polygynous husband played one game with her husband and 
one with her co-wife. In addition, monogamous (polygynous) spouses played their 
remaining two (one) games with an adult from another household (inter-household).
At the start of each intra-household PGG, participants were told the precise iden-
tity of their playing partner. At the start of each inter-household PGG they were told 
that they were playing with “a man” or “a woman” in the same workshop. Hence, 
participants in the inter-household games played with adults from other households 
and they did not know their playing partners’ identities, only their gender.5
The order of the games was randomized and participants received no indication 
that husbands, wives, and co-wives would play together until the start of their first 
intra-household game. These design details both minimized the likelihood of, and 
allowed us to investigate and rule out the possibility that participants played their three 
games as a portfolio rather than as a series of separate interactions. Ruling out portfo-
lio decision-making is important because, in the presence of such decision-making, 
any observed behavioral differences across monogamous and polygynous house-
holds could be owing to the former playing only one intra-household game, while 
the latter played two. For instance, polygynous husbands and wives could contrib-
ute differently from monogamous husbands and wives owing to differences in total 
expected earnings from the three games.6
After playing all three games, participants were asked to guess how much their 
partner in each game contributed, assuming an initial endowment of ₦220. The 
beliefs were not elicited before playing the games to avoid priming the participants 
to think specifically about strategic considerations.
Participants received their earnings from the three shared funds to which they 
could have contributed as a single payment with no breakdown at the end of the 
workshop. Because of this and the fact that participants’ initial endowments were 
known only to themselves, participants could contribute significantly less than their 
initial endowments while claiming to have contributed all.
C. Procedures
A single team conducted the workshops in all 16 communities. In each workshop, 
the participants received training in the PGG as a group. Then, during one-to-one 
interviews, each participant’s comprehension was tested and their contribution deci-
sions elicited.7 Once all the participants had made their decisions, each was paid in 
private. At every stage of a workshop the team followed a script and detailed proto-
col. The workshops were conducted entirely in Nupe.8
In most communities, two workshops were conducted, both on the same day. The 
exceptions were two small villages where a single workshop was planned due to 
5 Had we revealed the identity of the inter-household playing partners, both their reputations and the character-
istics of their relationships, while unknown to us, would have affected contribution decisions. 
6 In online Appendix Section 3, we test for portfolio effects and show that they are not driving our results. 
7 Comprehension of the game was good with more than 90 percent of test questions correctly answered. 
8 See online Appendix Section 6 for English translations of the scripts, the corresponding visual aids, and the 
detailed protocol. 
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small sample size, four villages in Shonga district in each of which the two planned 
workshops were amalgamated into one for logistical reasons, and one town (Lafiagi 
town) in which three workshops were held due to large sample size. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the workshops in their community. On average, 
a workshop involved 28 participants (minimum 8, maximum 50) and participants 
earned around ₦847 from the games plus a ₦250 show-up fee. 
Substantial care was taken to avoid communication within workshops and spill-
overs within and between communities. The workshops took place in community 
buildings, such as schools or health or community centers, with at least two separate 
rooms. The group training was given to all the participants in one room. The second 
room was used as a waiting room for those who had completed their interviews. 
Pre-planned seating arrangements in the training room ensured that marriage groups 
(spouses as well as co-wives) were separated. Participants were not allowed to talk 
to each other until they had finished their individual interviews and reached the 
waiting room, where they received a drink and a snack.
Participants in the two workshops in a community were not allowed to mix to 
avoid communication.9 Workshops within a single district were planned such that 
they would start the day after the weekly market day in that district. Spillovers 
between communities on days other than market days were expected to be very 
limited.
II. Results
A. Contribution Rates by Marriage Type
Panel A of Figure 1 presents the distributions of contribution rates for monoga-
mous and polygynous spouses and co-wives when playing one with another, within 
households, and the bars in panel B present the corresponding mean contribution 
rates. The test result in panel B pertains to the null hypothesis that mean contribution 
rates do not differ across polygynous and monogamous marriage groups.
Overall, intra-household contribution rates are high. Panel A reveals that within 
both household types, most spouses contributed their entire initial endowment. 
However, panel B indicates that polygynous marriage group members were, on aver-
age, significantly less cooperative, one with another, compared to those in monog-
amous marriages ( p = 0.047). On average, monogamous spouses contributed 88 
percent of their initial endowment to the shared fund, while polygynous spouses 
contributed only 78 percent.10
9 In Lafiagi, the third workshop was held on a second, consecutive day. Participants in Lafiagi were dispersed 
across neighborhoods, limiting potential communication between participants assigned to different workshops. 
10 The decisions made in the intra-household PGGs reflect both a willingness to make financial contributions to 
the common pot and, working in the opposite direction, a willingness to hide personally held resources. We find a 
correlation between decisions made in the intra-household PGGs and how much participants know about each oth-
er’s finances in everyday life, but no correlation with financial contributions to household expenditures. For further 
details, see Section 5 of the online Appendix. 
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B. Contribution Rates by Participant and Playing Partner Type
Next, we investigate whether cooperation within each household type varies sys-
tematically depending on who is interacting with whom. Figure 2 presents the mean 
contribution rates for each type of husband and wife when interacting with their 
spouses and, in the case of wives of polygynous husbands, their co-wives. The fig-
ure also presents the results of a series of comparison-of-means tests focusing on 
various pairs of defined subsamples.11


































































onogamous   n = 220
Polygynous   n = 456
87.9% 78.4%
Figure 1. Contributions to the Shared Fund by Monogamous and Polygynous Spouses
Notes:  Contribution rate is the amount contributed to the shared fund as a proportion of initial endowment. Each 
observation is a contributing decision. Panel A presents the distributions of contribution rates for monogamous 
spouses when playing together (dark, purple) and polygynous husbands and their wives when playing in pairs 
(husbands with wives or co-wives together) (light, green). Panel B presents the mean contribution rates. The black 
vertical whiskers are 95 percent confidence intervals generated using a linear regression of contribution rates on 
polygyny, in which interdependence within workshops is accounted for using a wild bootstrap (Cameron, Gelbach, 
and Miller 2008). The test result indicated by the horizontal bracket at the top of the panel is derived from the same 
regression: ** = difference significant at the 5 percent level. The circle and whiskers in white within each bar indi-
cate the mean and 95 percent confidence interval of the contribution rate for the same participant subsample, but 
when playing with members of other households. # = bin expanded to accommodate slightly higher and lower con-
tribution rates owing to initial endowments not always equaling 220 naira.
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Figure 2 indicates that, when playing with their spouses, polygynous husbands 
and wives contributed significantly less than monogamous husbands and wives: 80 
percent on average compared to 88 percent ( p = 0.051). Further dividing the sam-
ple reveals that, when playing with their wives, polygynous husbands contributed 
significantly less than monogamous husbands: 79 percent on average compared to 
89 percent ( p = 0.033). In contrast, the difference between the contributions made 
by the wives of monogamous and polygynous husbands when playing with those 
husbands was not significant: 87 percent compared to 80 percent ( p = 0.133).
The figure also indicates that, while the contribution rates of wives in polygynous 
marriages playing with their husbands were statistically indistinguishable from their 
husbands’ contribution rates (80 percent compared to 79 percent), the contribution 
rates of co-wives when playing with each other were significantly lower at 76 per-
cent ( p = 0.068 in a pooled analysis, p < 0.001 in a within-wife (fixed effects) 
analysis).
   




















Figure 2. Contributions to the Shared Fund by Marriage, Spouse, and Playing Partner Type
Notes:  The Mars symbols (blue) indicate husbands. The Venus symbols (pink) indicate wives. HM = monogamous 
husband; WM = monogamous wife; HP = polygynous husband; W1 = first wife of a polygynous husband; W2 = 
second wife of a polygynous husband. An arrow emanating from one symbol in the direction of another indicates 
the contributions made by spouses of former symbol type when playing with spouses of latter symbol type. The 
proportion inscribed on each arrow is the mean contribution rate. The means listed above and below the diagram 
are for pooled subsamples defined by the vertical dotted lines and corresponding braces. The test results on the hor-
izontal square brackets above and below these means are derived from a series of linear regressions presented in 
online Appendix Table A2 in which dependence within workshops is accounted for using a wild bootstrap. Within 
each pooled subsample (defined by vertical dotted lines and braces), the regressions indicate that the contribution 
rates can be pooled. ** = significantly different at the 5 percent level according to the pooled regression analysis; 
* = significantly different at the 10 percent level according to the pooled regression analysis; ‡‡‡ = significantly 
different at the 1 percent level according to a within-wife analysis. There are 676 observations.
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To sum up, Figure 2 reveals that the lower contribution rate in polygynous house-
holds compared to monogamous households was driven by two factors. First, when 
playing with their spouses, polygynous husbands and wives contributed signifi-
cantly less than monogamous husbands and wives, with the difference being driven 
primarily by husbands. Second, when co-wives played together, their contribution 
rates were significantly lower than when they played with their husbands.
C. Controlling for Other Factors
Next, we investigate whether the differences described in IIA and IIB are owing 
to cross-subsample variations in the participants’ experiences during the experimen-
tal sessions or individual characteristics. Column 1, Table 2, presents the regres-
sion results supporting the key comparison-of-means findings already described.12 
Column 2 presents the same set of regression results but after socioeconomic and 
experimental controls have been added.13
In panel A, adding these controls has very little impact on the size and signifi-
cance of the mean difference in contribution rates between monogamous and polyg-
ynous marriage group members when playing intra-household games. The same 
applies when focusing on husband-wife interactions only in panel B.
In panel C, adding controls reduces the size and significance of the difference 
between monogamous and polygynous husbands. Indeed, once the controls are 
added, we can no longer reject the null that monogamous and polygynous husbands 
are equally cooperative when interacting with their wives. This loss in significance 
is owing entirely to the inclusion of number of children in the regression.14 This is 
suggestive of a possible mechanism driving the mean difference. However, when 
number of children is included, while the p-value on the Polygynous identifier 
increases to 0.120 (just insignificant), the p-value on the number of children variable 
is 0.950, indicating a loss of power owing to multicollinearity rather than mecha-
nism identification. The Polygynous identifier and the number of children variable 
are, indeed, highly correlated ( p = 0.038, see Table 1 for subsample means).
Panel D focuses on wives’ contributions only, and includes a variable for polyg-
ynous wives playing with a female playing partner (P × FPP) to identify the dif-
ference in the cooperativeness of polygynous wives depending on whether they 
are interacting with their husbands or their co-wives. When controls are added, the 
difference between wives of monogamous and polygynous husbands (indicated by 
the coefficient on Polygynous) increases and becomes significant at the 5 percent 
level ( p = 0.034). This gain in significance cannot be attributed to the inclusion of 
any one specific control.15 The inclusion of controls does not affect the significant 
12 The within-wife, fixed effects regression is omitted in the interest of brevity. 
13 See online Appendix Section 2 and Tables A2–A5 for definitions of control variables and the results of the 
regressions with controls in full. See online Appendix Section 3 and Tables A6–A8 for analyses including further 
controls that allow us to rule out portfolio decision making. 
14 See online Appendix Table A4. The number of children with the playing partner (instead of total own number 
of children) and its interaction with Polygynous are not significant either (results available upon request). 
15 See online Appendix Table A5. 
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difference in polygynous wives’ contribution rates depending on whether they are 
interacting with their husbands or their co-wives.
D. Selection versus Causation
Next, we investigate whether the difference in contribution rates between monog-
amous and polygynous households is causal, i.e., being in a polygynous marriage 
causes people to be less cooperative, or owing to selection, i.e., less cooperative 
people select into polygyny.
If cooperation is lower in polygynous households as a result of selection, we 
would expect members of polygynous households to be less cooperative also when 
playing with members of other households, i.e., when playing inter-household 
games. The whiskered white circles in panel B of Figure 1 indicate the mean con-
tribution rates by the same samples of spouses but when playing with members 
Table 2—Intra-household and Inter-household Contribution Rates by Player Type









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Husbands’ and wives’ contributions
Polygynous (P) −0.095 (0.047) −0.099 (0.024) 0.026 (0.329) 0.034 (0.319) 
Observations 676 663 668 648
Panel B. Husbands’ and wives’ contribution in husband-wife interactions only
Polygynous (P) −0.083 (0.051) −0.076 (0.045) N/A N/A
Observations 524 511
Panel C. Husbands’ contributions only
Polygynous (P) −0.100 (0.033) −0.080 (0.120) 3.7e−4 (0.991) 0.027 (0.687) 
Female playing partner (FPP) N/A N/A −0.023 (0.378) −0.020 (0.422) 
P × FPP N/A N/A 0.092 (0.289) 0.063 (0.526) 
Sum of coeffs. on P + (P × FPP) N/A N/A 0.092 (0.323) 0.089 (0.453)
Observations 262 253 296 284
Panel D. Wives’ contributions only
Polygynous (P) −0.066 (0.133) −0.091 (0.034) −0.008 (0.890) 0.002 (0.960) 
Female playing partner (FPP) N/A N/A −0.008 (0.756) −0.019 (0.333) 
P × FPP −0.043 (0.068) −0.044 (0.076) 0.045 (0.465) 0.042 (0.552) 
Sum of coeff.s on P + (P × FPP) −0.109 (0.029) −0.134 (0.007) 0.037 (0.657) 0.044 (0.626) 
Observations 414 410 372 364
Notes: This table presents coefficients and sums of coefficients from linear regressions and, in parentheses, p-val-
ues corresponding to two-tailed tests of  H 0 : coefficient or sum of coefficients equals 0; in panels A and B, the one 
explanatory variable of interest is “Polygynous;” in panels C and D, the three explanatory variables of interest are 
“Polygynous,” “Female playing partner,” and the interaction between the two; in panel B, there are no inter-household 
model estimations because the focal sample is contributions in husband-wife interactions; p-values are adjusted to 
account for inter-dependence within workshops using a wild bootstrap (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008); in 
panel C, “Female Playing Partner (FPP)” and the interaction term drop out of the intra-household models because 
husbands play all of their intra-household games with women (their wives); in panel D, “Female Playing Partner 
(FPP)” drops out of the intra-household estimations for wives because monogamous wives play only with men (their 
husbands) and the coefficient on the interaction term identifies the difference in the contribution rates of wives of 
polygynous husbands when interacting with their co-wives and when interacting with their husbands. Controls are 
initial endowment, session size, order of play in session, delay identifier, second/third session in community identi-
fiers, second/third game in session identifiers, enumerator identifiers, participant age, education, ethnicity, religion, 
earning identifier, wealth, urban identifier, and log number of children (with one added before applying the log trans-
formation). For the full definitions of these controls, see the note for online Appendix Table A2.
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of other households. Contributions by both monogamous and polygynous spouses 
were significantly lower in inter-household games and, if anything, the contribution 
rate for the monogamous spouses was lower (36 percent) than the contribution rate 
for the polygynous spouses (39 percent).16 In Table 2, columns 3–4, we show that 
this difference is statistically insignificant for the full sample (Panel A).
Focusing on the husbands, in Table 2, panel C, columns 3–4, we investigate 
whether men who select into polygynous marriage are less cooperative toward oth-
ers in general and toward women specifically. We do the latter by including an indi-
cator for whether the playing partner was female and the interaction between this 
and Polygynous in the analysis. The insignificance of the coefficient on Polygynous 
indicates that there was no difference in the contribution rates of monogamous and 
polygynous husbands when they were playing with men from other households. 
The insignificance of the coefficient on the interaction between Polygynous and 
Female playing partner indicates that playing with a woman rather than a man from 
another household did not affect contribution rates differently for polygynous versus 
monogamous husbands. Finally, the insignificance of the sum of the coefficients on 
Polygynous and the interaction term indicates that there was no difference in the 
contribution rates of polygynous and monogamous husbands when they were play-
ing with women from other households.
Turning to the wives, the insignificant coefficients on Polygynous in Table 2, 
panel D, columns 3–4, indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
wives of monogamous and polygynous husbands were equally cooperative when 
playing with men to whom they were not married.
Finally, consider the finding that the contribution rates of co-wives when playing 
with each other were lower than when they were playing with their husbands (see 
Table 2, panel D, column 1). As the critical difference is within wife, this cannot 
be owing to the selection of women into polygyny based on their cooperativeness 
with other people. However, women who are less inclined to cooperate with other 
women, while being no less inclined to cooperate with men, could have selected into 
polygynous marriage. The statistical insignificance of the coefficient on the interac-
tion between Polygynous and Female playing partner in Table 2, panel D, column 3, 
indicates that we cannot reject the null that in inter-household games, playing with a 
woman did not affect contribution rates differently for wives of monogamous versus 
polygynous husbands.
In sum, these estimations offer no evidence of selection of men and women into 
polygyny based on either their cooperativeness with other people in general or their 
differential willingness to cooperate with men and women. Thus, we conclude that 
the lower cooperation rate within polygynous marriage groups was owing to an 
effect of the marriage institution rather than selection. Polygyny causes spouses to 
be less cooperative, one with another. Further, within polygynous marriages, wives 
are even less cooperative with their co-wives than they are with their husbands.
16 These contribution rates are similar to those observed in public good games around the world. For example, 
Wilkinson and Klaes (2012) indicates that, in general, anonymously matched unmarried subjects contribute about 
half of their endowments. 
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E. The Conditioning of Cooperation on Beliefs about Others’ Cooperativeness
One possible explanation for the difference in intra-household cooperativeness 
between monogamous and polygynous marriage groups is that the behavioral foun-
dations of cooperation vary across the two types. Cooperation can be motivated by 
altruism, in which case husbands and wives will not deviate from full cooperation 
even when they believe that their spouse is likely to do so. Adherence to a strong 
cooperative norm would have a similar effect. Alternatively, cooperation may be 
based on reciprocity and, hence, conditional on the cooperation of others. In this 
case, husbands and wives will deviate from full cooperation when they believe that 
their spouse or co-wife will do likewise. More conditional and less altruistic or norm-
driven, unconditional cooperation could explain the lower cooperation rate within 
polygynous households. Using data on participants’ beliefs about their playing part-
ners’ contributions, we can undertake a preliminary investigation into whether par-
ticipants’ own contributions are conditioned on beliefs about others’ contributions 
and whether this varies across monogamous and polygynous households.17
Figure 3 presents the estimated linear relationships between husbands’ and 
wives’ own contributions and their beliefs about their playing partners’ contribu-
tions for: monogamous husbands and wives when playing with each other (solid 
dark, purple line), polygynous husbands and their wives when playing with each 
other or wives with their co-wives (solid light, green line), monogamous husbands 
and wives when playing with members of other households (dashed dark, purple 
line), polygynous husbands and their wives when playing with members of other 
households (dashed light, green line).18
Focusing, first, on intra-household interactions, husbands and wives who believed 
that their spouses or co-wives would contribute 100 percent of their initial endow-
ments chose to contribute 95 percent of their own initial endowment, on average, 
regardless of whether their household was monogamous or polygynous. However, 
husbands and wives who believed that their spouses or co-wives would contribute 
less than 100 percent conditioned their own contributions differently depending on 
whether their household was monogamous or polygynous.
Within monogamous households, a 10 percentage point reduction in belief about 
a spouse’s contribution is associated with a 4 percentage point reduction in one’s 
own contribution. Within polygynous households, a 10 percentage point reduction 
in belief about a spouse’s or co-wife’s contribution is associated with a significantly 
( p = 0.006) larger 7 percentage point reduction.19 This analysis, combined with the 
histogram in the panel A of Figure 1, indicates that full cooperation is a common 
reference point for members of both monogamous and polygynous households, but 
that they respond differently when they anticipate that their spouses or co-wives are 
17 The usefulness of this analysis depends on the quality of the beliefs data. If the elicited beliefs are inaccurate 
or biased and the inaccuracy or bias differs between members of monogamous and polygynous households, the 
validity of our comparative findings would be undermined. Online Appendix Section 4 and Table A9 present the 
beliefs data and rule out concerns about its quality. 
18 Figure 3 is derived from the regressions presented in online Appendix Table A10, columns 1 and 3. 
19 These findings are robust to the inclusion of experimental and socioeconomic controls (see online Appendix 
Section A4 and Table A10). When the controls are added, we also find that cooperation is significantly more condi-
tional between co-wives as compared to between polygynous husbands and their wives (p = 0.070). 
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going to deviate from this reference point. A closer inspection of the data reveals that 
the difference between the estimated relationships is primarily owing to differences 
in the relative frequencies of full unconditional versus conditional cooperation.20
Here, once again, we can exploit the inter-household PGGs involving the same 
husbands and wives to investigate whether being in a polygynous marriage causes 
individuals to become more reciprocally cooperative with their spouses and co-wives 
or whether more reciprocating types are more likely to select into polygynous mar-
riages. We cannot reject the null that the purple and green dashed lines in Figure 3 
have the same intercept and the same slope. When playing with members of other 
households, a 10 percentage point reduction in belief about a playing partner’s contri-
bution is associated with a 5 percentage point reduction in one’s own contribution.21 
20 See online Appendix Section 4 and Table A11 for details. 
21 Online Appendix Table A10 indicates that these findings are robust to the inclusion of experimental and 
socioeconomic controls. 
Figure 3. The Conditioning of Own Cooperation on Beliefs about Playing Partners’ Cooperation among 
Monogamous and Polygynous Spouses
Notes: The two solid lines are derived from a single linear regression in which the dependent variable is own con-
tribution when interacting with spouse or co-wife; the two dashed lines are derived from a single linear regression 
in which the dependent variable is own contribution when interacting with a member of another household; poten-
tial dependence within workshops is accounted for using a wild bootstrap. *** = slopes significantly different from 
zero at the 1 percent level.
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It is also worth noting that the conditioning of cooperation on beliefs differs markedly 
depending on whether the interaction is intra- or inter-household. In the former, coop-
eration tends to be either high and unconditional or conditional. In the latter it tends to 
be either minimal and unconditional or conditional.22
To sum up, monogamous spouses are more inclined to be unconditionally coop-
erative, that is, they contribute (almost) their entire initial endowment irrespective 
of how much they expect their spouse to contribute. In contrast, when polygynous 
household members expect their spouses or co-wives to deviate from full coopera-
tion, they are more inclined to make conditionally cooperative decisions, that is, to 
contribute approximately the same amount as they expect their spouse or co-wife 
to contribute. Thus, cooperation appears motivated more by altruism or adherence 
to a strict cooperative norm in monogamous households and more by reciprocity 
in polygynous households. Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that individuals 
select into polygyny depending on how they condition their cooperativeness on their 
beliefs about others’ cooperativeness.
III. Conclusion
Using a carefully designed experiment to measure cooperation between all pos-
sible interacting pairs within monogamous and polygynous households, we find 
that, while intra-household cooperation is high and the majority of spouses aim to 
maximize joint utility, cooperation is lower within polygynous compared to monog-
amous households. In part, this is because cooperation is lower between polygy-
nous husbands and their wives as compared to monogamous husbands and their 
wives and, in part, this is because cooperation is particularly low between co-wives. 
In contrast, we find no differences in cooperativeness between monogamous and 
polygynous spouses when they interact with men or women from other households, 
indicating that the differences in intra-household cooperation are causal rather than 
owing to selection.
Turning to behavioral foundations, we find that cooperation between monoga-
mous spouses tends to be unconditional and consistent with high levels of pure 
altruism or strict adherence to norms of spousal cooperation. In comparison, coop-
eration between polygynous spouses and co-wives tends to be more reciprocal, a 
considerable proportion cooperating only to the extent that they believe the other 
with whom they are interacting will cooperate. Further, when playing with members 
of other households, there is no difference in how monogamous and polygynous 
spouses condition their contributions on beliefs about the other’s contribution, indi-
cating that the differences in the foundations of cooperation between monogamous 
and polygynous households are not owing to reciprocal types being more inclined 
to select into polygyny.
The experiment was designed to document whether and how cooperation differs 
between polygynous and monogamous households and to rule out potential selec-
tion of less cooperative individuals into polygyny. While there is more research to be 
22 See online Appendix Section 4 and Table A11 for details. 
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done, especially with regard to the behavioral and other mechanisms underpinning 
the differences in cooperation that we observe, our findings provide a strong foun-
dation upon which to build.
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